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Abstract 
The paper offers a brief discussion about the role of transport infrastructure in the current 
growth strategy followed by the EU. As a corridor is the locus where transport 
infrastructure and growth should interact more effectively, the central part of Corridor V is 
considered as an interesting case study. A growth scenario for eight countries is provided to 
show that wide growth disparities are to be expected during the next decade.  The final part 
of the paper speculates about inflation differentials that are likely to emerge when growth 
differentials tend to persist inside a monetary union. As the Euro zone will be enlarged to 
host fast-growers in Corridor V such as Slovenia (maybe as soon as 2007), Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic, growth differentials and the single monetary policy could make it difficult 
to deliver a common monetary environment.    
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  The EU has a transport policy and the idea of building the TENs is 
an important aspect of that  policy, but in considering the available literature 
dealing with the relationship between infrastructure investment and growth, 
one soon realizes that the real impact of that policy is still uncertain. There 
is, in particular, no certainty about the causal relationship between real 
growth and public capital investment and the wealth of empirical 
investigations offered in recent years show that results critically depend on 
adopted methodologies and geographical scale. Even less is known about 
the dynamic effects of infrastructure in general and, in particular, along a 
corridor (Section 2). In a recent European project
1 it has been assumed that 
the relationship between economic growth and transport infrastructure could 
be more evident along a corridor such as Corridor V than it would be in 
general. Section 3 provides a growth scenario for the eight countries 
(France, Italy, Switzerland, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic)  in the central part of Corridor V. Growth differentials obviously 
exist across the eight countries, but the structural breaks that have taken 
place in the Centre East European countries in the last decade spell effects 
that combine with those produced by public infrastructure capital. To a 
certain extent, growth differentials are physiological and also useful 
provided that they make real convergence in per capita income possible. 
However, growth differentials could be a problem in the future enlarged 
Euro zone if they were wide and lasting. Section 4 concludes the article and 
provides a discussion of the potential inflationary effects of growth 
disparities in relation to the Euro zone single monetary policy. We assume 
that in the future enlarged Euro zone, a single money demand will  exist and 
that it will be similar to that of  the present twelve members. Under such 
circumstances, the single wholesale money market for the enlarged Euro 






countries, otherwise growth differentials combined with a single monetary 
policy – however valid it may be in the aggregate – would deliver lasting 






2 Infrastructure and growth 
The European Union is a two-layer system; the broader layer is 
formed by a single market with a currency area (ERM-II), while the 
narrower one is  an embedded monetary union (EMU). The basic economic 
aim of the EU is growth through market integration and cohesion and its 
most successful initiative has been the single market. The various 
microeconomic policies implemented since the creation of the single market 
in 1992 have been largely aimed at removing market distortions, but - de 
facto – they encapsulate the old common agricultural policy, other cohesion 
policies and the EMS-II, a currency area. The Euro zone -- a true monetary 
union -- pursues macroeconomic stability through the combination of a 
single monetary policy and surveillance over independent fiscal policies. 
Nevertheless, since the inception of the single currency, the Euro zone has 
experienced a full economic cycle but the monetary union does not seem to 
have delivered as the cycle has been more painful than the general one.  
<<<  FIGURE 1 >>>  
It is well known that the Euro zone continues to under perform the 
EU, which, in turn, lags behind  America. The gap between the UE and the 
US has increased over the years and the prevailing opinion is that its origin 
is in the supply side of the economy (Sapir et al., 2004; Florio, 2005; 
OECD, 2006, Scarpetta et al., 2000).  
As the low increase in productivity and in the labour force are seen 
as the origin of the gap, one could ask whether a lack of infrastructure could 
have a role in the dismal result. The same issue was famously  raised in the   4 
US when productivity was in decline there (Aschauer, 1989) and there is a 
strand of literature focusing the relation between public infrastructure 
capital and growth (e.g. Gramlich, 1994, Sturm, 1998 and Ezcurra et al., 
2005). Transport infrastructure, however, has also a political importance. 
Since the days of the Roman Empire transport infrastructure has been used 
to make strategic integration possible, particularly when new peripheries are 
added to the core. With reference to a large economic entity loosely 
integrated at its periphery and with large regional disparities such as the 
Europe of fifteen years ago, it was then sensible to include integration and 
cohesion as policy priorities. It also made sense to look at the provision of 
new transport, communication and energy networks as a convenient way to 
derive full benefit from the common market. These two considerations 
clearly were behind the introduction of a transport policy and, in particular, 
of the Trans-European Networks in transport, telecommunications and 
energy in the EU Treaty (Maastricht, 1992). It would have been very helpful 
if increased competition and efficiency in transport and communication 
activities, and new infrastructure capital had raised accessibility and 
integration of the peripheral areas and decreased congestion in core 
metropolitan areas. By reducing costs, deepening integration  and 
eliminating bottlenecks the EU should have boosted its potential growth. 
Statistical evidence fails to prove this assumption as according the usual 
criteria the EU and the Euro zone have both underperformed. The most 
comprehensive explanation of the relatively poor economic performance of 
the EU has been offered in the Agenda for a Growing Europe (Sapir et al. 
2004) which helped to focus a fundamental inconsistency between 
objectives and results. While Europe was providing itself with a large single 
market,  which of course is good for mass industrial and agricultural 
production, it was undergoing a massively large shift in the composition of 
demand, production and employment in favour of services. The Agenda 
draws attention to the fact that in order to flourish growth seems to require 
more than factor accumulation, imitation, market scale and industry. Indeed, 
the Authors put forward the view according to which gross capital formation   5 
– as the engine of growth -- in a mature service economy appears to be less 
crucial than it is in industrial economies. In particular, when the economy 
gets closer to the technological frontier, R&D and effective innovation must 
replace mere imitation in order to keep productivity growing, This means 
that the most  effective  policies for the EU are those able to favour  the 
accumulation of knowledge as well as the entry and growth of new 
producers.  In the Agenda for a Growing Europe (Sapir et al., 2004) little 
attention is given to infrastructure as it is mentioned only as a condition 
allowing exploitation of the full advantages of the enlarged common market, 
although it is hypothesized  that such advantages are one-shot and thus 
unable to permanently affect the rate of growth of productivity. In the 
Agenda it is clearly stated, nonetheless, that priority must be given to 
community projects instead of national ones and particularly to East-West 
rather than to North-South connections.  
The multimodal axis connecting Lisbon to Kiev lies right along 
Corridor V, and is a perfect example of integrated East-West European 
connections.  The eight countries (France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic) are ones whose 
economy is potentially more deeply interested by the central portion of 
Corridor V, as well as by other TENs . There is, in particular, the large 
territory which is the target of the Interreg III B, Alpine Space and, more 
specifically, of the international project dubbed AlpenCorS, formed by a 
number of partners from France, Italy, Austria and Slovenia.  
The problem at hand is the assessment of the real effectiveness of the 
infrastructure capital represented by the TENs. Economic research, 
however, offers little guidance to decision makers as the ultimate dynamic 
economic effects of network availability and, in particular, those delivered  
by the reduction in transport costs are uncertain (Gramlich, 1994). It seems 
to be really difficult to establish a direct causal relation between the 
availability of infrastructure capital and the actual economic performance of 
different countries, regions and metropolitan areas.    6 
Any cost reduction draws customers closer to sellers and thus 
broadens the market area. Producers, therefore, can exploit the returns of a 
larger scale, but must face stronger competition. The ensuing concentration 
in production (through plant scale and agglomeration) usually increases 
overall efficiency. This has certainly been the case of the EU, where new 
infrastructure has delivered a one-off increase in productivity through 
restructuring, delocalization and just-in-time. The process seems to have 
increased productivity but reduced employment; in the Agenda for a 
Growing Europe,  Sapir and others pointed out the inverse relation between 
productivity and employment. Winner companies can locate where costs are 
lower as inside a well-connected and integrated  Union, knowledge, goods, 
people, capital and profits can be moved easily. There is no guarantee that 
the hardship produced by the loss of jobs and industries in the loser regions 
will be compensated by more exports to the winner regions and by lower 
prices of imported goods. In the real world, indeed, there are many 
examples of how location decisions make economic disparities wider as 
economic development ultimately depends on the capabilities that different 
people acquire.  It is not at all clear then whether more integration through 
public infrastructure capital and more transport accessibility automatically 
implies faster growth everywhere and, particularly, in laggard regions.  
An entirely different approach to the problem is to measure the 
correlation between infrastructure investment and growth. One obvious 
possibility is that public infrastructure capital acts directly on  productivity
2, 
private investment and growth.  At least from Aschauer (1989) and 
Morrison – Schwartz (1996) it has been argued that after the provision of 
public capital, producers reduce costs and increase the demand for factors. 
The return of existing capital, in particular, increases, thus providing an 
incentive for further investment.  Others have observed that the correlation 
between growth and infrastructure is spurious as the causal relation goes in 
both directions. China seems to be a prominent case in point. China  started 
building its infrastructure after the take-off which started in the eighties, i.e. 
                                                 
2 Some prefer to concentrate on production costs.   7 
after financial and human resources were raised to the necessary level. It 
would have been inefficient to start earlier, i.e. during the take-off, and to 
devote too many of the scarce resources to infrastructure building. 
Ultimately, the vast literature offers no guidance as the results seem to 
depend very much on the methodology used in the assessment. The exiting 
literature indicates that the relation between infrastructure and economic 
performance can be assessed both at the national and the regional level (e.g. 
Ezcurra et al., 2005). As results differ, we have argued that infrastructure 
and growth can be seen to interact more effectively along a corridor. 
  
3 National growth scenarios  
While being unsure about the real efficacy of promoting growth 
through public capital, the EU must face significant growth disparities. 
Germany and Italy, for instance, are expected to grow at 1% in 2006  while 
the growth rate in Ireland is expected to slow down to 8.8%. In this section, 
we restrict the focus to Corridor V as an interesting case. To draw a growth 
scenario for the eight countries one could make the traditional assumption of 
a constant growth rate or the more realistic one according to which 
important shocks have the capacity to alter the growth rate permanently. By 
using the trend component in GDP data
3 for the period 1990-2003
4,  we 
obtained  the constant growth rates reported in column 1 of Table 1.  The 
range goes from 0.8% to 3.62%. By assuming that events such as transition 
to the market  
<<<   TABLE 1  >>> 
economy, accession to the EU or the start of single monetary policy  and, 
last but not least, infrastructure building are able to permanently alter the 
growth rate, one has to deal with trends that are not linear. Indeed, while 







countries were not members in the period concerned. France and Italy have 
also been in the EU since the beginning (1993) while Austria entered only in 
1995. Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Croatia have undergone 
transition and made big infrastructure investments. While Hungary, 
Slovenia and Slovak Republic have been members of the EU since 2004, 
Croatia is a prospective candidate. Of course, Switzerland has not been 
affected by such events. The eight countries, therefore, are not only 
differently equipped in terms of capital, human and knowledge stocks, but 
underwent different shocks during the nineties. By their very nature, 
transition and events such as the single market, the Maastricht criteria and 
the single currency are supposed to change the growth trend. This  premise 
leads us to question the assumption of a constant rate of growth in the 
countries whose economies have been shocked in such ways. Indeed, while 
earlier growth theories posited that growth is constant in the long run, 
nowadays the common understanding is that particular events such as 
technological change, infrastructure investment, trade integration and 
institutional reforms could permanently alter macroeconomic performance. 
Besides a predictable and stable component, there is a non-predictable 
growth component reflecting the non-transitory impact of those shocks, 
which makes it very difficult to assess the precise characteristics of the trend 
in any historical series of GDP data.  The distinctive and practical feature of 
the various techniques available is that the analyst must continuously 
reformulate the forecast to take into account the fact that the growth rate is 
continuously changing. In our specific case, it was particularly difficult to 
separate the trend component from the cyclical component, as the available 
historical series are very short and are very likely to incorporate structural 
breaks. We believe that an efficient way to forecast growth rates is to 
consider all the information available. More precisely, we did not, therefore, 
try to separate them and we merely estimated the constant growth rate  n g , 
for each historical series of length n, satisfying 
1
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.  
The equation forces all the elements  of the historical series to have a   9 
bearing on the estimated growth rate  n g , which changes with the length of t 
and are inherently transit he time series. The part of the vagaries that are 
present and have a sufficiently high frequency are automatically smoothed 
away in the formula and cancel out within the period. A different and 
successive estimate  1 + n g of the growth rate can be considered more reliable 
than the previous one as it is able to encompass both the predictable and 
non-predictable parts of the trend with reference to a longer time series.  
  
The figures obtained with series ending 2003 (Table 1, column two),  
show that Switzerland  (the country with the highest per capita income level 
in the group of eight countries) is forecast to grow  less than 1%. The 
countries that have undergone transition are expected to grow quite rapidly: 
4% Slovenia, 4.24% Slovak Republic. It is interesting to underline that in 
the second scenario their growth performance improves substantially;  while 
the forecast for Croatia and Hungary, though slightly reduced, is still 
significant.  
 
4 The perils of growth disparities in the Euro zone 
As explained above, the forecasts were intended to draw a GDP 
scenario for the countries forming the central part of Corridor V. The 
methodology adopted offers the advantage of being  able to convey at each 
moment all the information available and, at the same time, to be a very 
simple way of assessing medium-term potential growth. There is no 
distinction to be made between trend and cycle to be made, but we know 
that the trend component implies a given change in the labour force and 
labour productivity. From the mere economic point of view, the 
sustainability of the growth process presupposes that infrastructure capital 
grows at the speed necessary to deliver the necessary increase in labour 
productivity. Indeed, a shortage of infrastructure is held to impair 
productivity and growth, even though infrastructure is not a sufficient 
condition for growth. The EU has given a role to transport, communication   10 
and energy networks at the community level on the assumption  that not 
only are they a basic precondition of growth, but that they are also necessary 
to exploit the advantages of the internal market. Besides harmonization, 
interoperability, market liberalization  and mode rebalancing, the EU has 
planned to promote supra-national networks.  
 
The forecast shows that growth disparities are likely to appear, at 
least for a while across the countries that are in the Euro zone and those that, 
at a certain stage, are expected to become new members. The preceding 
argument indicates, furthermore, that  infrastructure capital or other factors 
could produce unintended growth disparities across the EU. The very 
existence of large disparities in per capita income is a problem in itself, but 
the existence of wide and permanent disparities in the rate of growth inside 
the Euro zone would be a further problem as it could bear upon inflation 
differentials. As inflation differentials imply disparities in the real interest 
rates and the real exchange rates of the different countries inside the Euro 
zone, the ECB finds it difficult to deliver a single monetary climate across 
the Euro area. Since the single  monetary policy cannot target inflation 
disparities, the ECB is interested in removing the causes of such disparities. 
The ECB apparently holds the view (ECB, 2005) that, to some extent, 
inflation differentials are desirable as they are the outcome of an 
equilibrating adjustment process. Inflation differentials, indeed, come in two 
forms: bad and good. According to the so-called  Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
inflation in a country is proportional to the gap in the productivity growth 
rates of exportable and non-exportable goods and services. This means that 
countries that are catching up should experience higher inflation. This is a 
typical example of good inflation differentials.  Besides these differentials, 
however, there are differentials which are excessive or bad as they appear to 
be the product of structural inefficiencies, market rigidities and fiscal 
mismanagement. We observe that both these  differentials come from the 
supply side of the economy. The implementation of a single monetary 
policy in the enlarged Euro zone would become difficult if the nominal   11 
interest rate were to be the same across the different countries while national 
growth rates were markedly different, as real interest rates and real 
exchange rates would diverge across the member countries. It comes as no 
surprise that the ECB is interested in monitoring inflation differentials in 
order to identify structural barriers that hamper macroeconomic adjustment 
of the supply side and distort the impact of the single monetary policy . The 
ECB, however, does not even contemplate the possibility that similar 
distortion could come from the demand side, and there is a risk that the 
single monetary policy  could add  to the mentioned sources of inflation 
differentials thus not only more making the conduct of monetary policy 
more difficult, but also making it harder to correctly identify the effective 
inflationary impact of supply inefficiencies.  
 
There is, indeed, the distinct possibility that a single monetary policy  
combined with permanent disparities in the rate of growth could become a 
further source of inflation differentials particularly if the different national 
monetary markets fail to integrate in a single market. Consider current 
money demand in the Euro zone.  Conventional money demand models 
assume that real GDP, price level and interest rates are the determinants of 
money demand and the recent estimates of the euro-wide money demand 
equation are no exception.  Bruggeman et al., 2003 and Brand – Cassola, 
2004, and ECB, 2004 for instance, estimate that a stable long-run demand 
equation for the whole Euro area such as:  t t t t i y k p m β α − + = −  exists; 
where:  t t p m −  and  t y are logarithms of the stock of broad money deflated 
by the GDP deflator and real GDP.  k is a constant, and  t i is the spread 
between a market interest rate and money’s own rate of return, i.e. the 
opportunity cost of holding liquidity. In the different estimates, it turns out 
that the elasticity of GDP is always close to  3 . 1 , i.e.:  3 . 1 = α . The estimate 
of the other parameter is significant, but changes according to the market 
interest rate used to define the spread. As a matter of fact, it is   
8 . 0 8 . 1 − ≤ ≤ − β .  The European Central Bank apparently manages to offer 
the Euro system the right quantity of liquidity in the whole Euro area and to   12 
keep the short term interest rate at the right level. In doing this, it apparently 
uses excess liquidity measures derived from an equation of the type 
described above and a large series of other indicators on prices and costs, on 
an aggregate basis. When there are permanent growth disparities, the 
aggregate excess liquidity measure cannot signal differences stemming from 
the disparities in the growth rates.  When real growth rates differ across the 
Euro zone, the single monetary policy  implies inflation rates which are 
different across space. This can easily be seen by differentiating  the 
demand equation with respect to time. This makes it possible to translate  
the relevant real growth rate into the inflation rate, from the demand side of 
the economy. Let  r y &indicate the national growth rate in country r  and 
r p &the corresponding inflation rate. When the money stock grows at the 
target constant common rate 045 . 0 = t m &  (Brand - Cassola, 2004), the 
equation in terms of percentage rates of changes corresponding to the one 
defined above is:  r r y p & & 3 . 1 045 , 0 − =  as it is sensible to assume, the spread as 
a constant, at least in the long run. Following this approach,  the growth 
rates given above for the members of the European monetary union  and its 
future members can thus be readily translated into the inflation rates shown 
in Table 2.  
 
      <<<   TABLE 2   >>> 
 
The state of knowledge about money demand in the Euro area seems 
to corroborate the existence of a pan-European or single money demand 
equation more stable than national counterparts (Issing et al., 2001);  it is, 
therefore, logically correct to use the single money demand equation for 
such different entities for which a national real growth rate is estimated. As 
the Euro money market is formed by the wholesale market (formed by the 
ECB system and the banks) and the national retail money markets 
(households and non-bank institutions) there is the need that liquidity 
spontaneously flows from places where it is abundant to places where it is 
scarce through the wholesale market. In a really integrated monetary market   13 
this should hopefully be the case, but it is not immediately obvious that this 
really happens in the Euro zone, i.e. that liquidity spontaneously flows from 
slow growers to fast growers.  We know, indeed, that while the single 
monetary policy has successfully stabilized member countries’ inflation 
rates, a significant degree of country heterogeneity still pervades the Euro 
area (Busetti et al., 2006). 
As the long run growth rate of the Euro zone in the current way is 
estimated to be 2.25%, it turns out that Austria, whose estimated growth rate 
practically coincides with this figure, is bound to have an inflation rate 
lower than 2% (Table 2), i.e. perfectly in line with the ECB’s definition of 
price stability. Not so for France and Italy which, by the same token, would 
permanently be above the target rate. The prospective members of the Euro 
zone  -- Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia -- have been able to growth 
faster than the average rate 2.25% and are expected to have a very low or 
even negative inflation rate. The Slowak Republic and Slovenia, in other 
words, will have to come to terms with permanent deflationary pressure 
from the demand side.  
In conclusion, the existence of a single monetary policy and a single 
nominal interest rate will not prevent real interest rates from diverging 
inside the Euro zone. In the countries where the real growth rate is 
permanently lower, inflation will be higher (as in France and Italy) and the 
real interest rate accordingly lower. In countries where real growth is 
permanently higher (as in the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) inflation will 
be lower and real interest rates higher. In the enlarged Euro zone, the ECB 
would probably be forced to revise up the estimated average steady state 
real growth rate. This should bring about an increase in the target money 
aggregate growth. Perhaps the parameters of the money demand equation 
would  be changed as well, but the argument above will still apply. Any 
increase in the dispersion in real growth rates would deliver an increase in 
the dispersion  in inflation rates. The inflation target of the ECB is defined 
over the whole Euro zone, but the existence of a single money demand and 
the existence of inflation disparities will not be without consequences:   14 
inflation pressure in slow-growing countries would have to coexist with 
deflation pressure in the fast-growing countries. It remains to be seen 
whether the single monetary market would be able to move the existing 
liquidity from where it is abundant (i.e in slow growers) to where it is scarce 
(i.e. to fast growers). If the wholesale money market in the Euro zone were 
not able to completely rebalance liquidity across borders of national retail 
money markets,  the disparities  in inflation rates will impact differently real 
exchange cross-rates  and the resulting differences in real interest rates will 
impact differently market values of all real and financial assets in the 
national economies.    15 
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Fig 1 - Real GDP growth in the Euro zone and the OECD 






















Austria (*) 1,89 2,24
France (*) 1,59 1,5
Italy (*) 1,3 1,48
Switzerland (*) 0,8 0,75
Croatia (°) 2,68 2,49
Hungary (°) 2,79 2,51
Slovak Republic (°) 3,62 4,24
Slovenia (°)  3,46 4
(*) 1990-2003. .
(°) 1992-2003
Tab 2. Growth differentials and inflation 




Slovenia (*) 4 -0,7
Hungary 2,51 1,2
Slovak Republic  4,24 -1,0
Croatia 2,68 1,0
(*) likely to enter the 
Euro zone in 2007
 